Reports : ECHELON - A vast spy network for interception of telecommunication

Press release February 26, 2000

ECHELON - A vast spy network for interception of telecommunications

According to British author Duncan Campbell, speaking at the public hearing on February 23, organised by the EU the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, his report on the global telecommunications interception network Echelon is the first real proof that such a network actually exists.

Echelon is allegedly operated by the US National Security Agency and the British intelligence service GCHQ. It is not only used for military purposes, but also for industrial espionage, Mr Campbell's report claims. Thus, European companies have lost major contracts, while international trade negotiations have been targeted as well. Apart from the US and the UK three other English-speaking nations are cooperating within Echelon - Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Telecommunications transmitted by short-wave radio, satellite, submarine cable and the Internet are routinely intercepted and processed by largely unmanned computers. Intercepted messages are filtered through the 'Echelon Dictionaries', which contain a variety of selection criteria. Every half hour 1 million messages are intercepted and filtered, of which some twenty are looked at in detail and only two end up in a report, he said.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, according to Mr Campbell, the US in 1999 declassified documents describing the activation of Echelon units and Echelon's functions. US Air Force documents show how commercial satellite equipment is used for the interception of satellite communication. He maintained that the existence and the fundamental functioning of Echelon are now beyond dispute. This is the evidence that former Commissioner Bangemann said he needed when the European Parliament asked him in 1998 about Echelon. Other evidence was obtained when a New Zealand TV station was able to film the inside of the operations centre in Waihopai, New Zealand, undetected.

Echelon listening posts are to be found in West Virginia (USA), Leitrim (Canada), Waihopai (New Zealand), Bad Aibling (Germany), in Japan and on a British base in Cyprus. In all, ten stations have been identified so far. A new submarine, the USS Jimmy Carter, is to be brought into use for the interception of cable communications in the year 2004 and is expected to be targeted at communications from Europe and Japan.

Intercepting Internet communication is relatively easy, said Mr Campbell, as most international communications are routed via the USA. The NSA has nine sites in use for intercepting international communications. The NSA is currently planning to increase storage capacities to 1,000 terabytes. This should enable the recording of 90 days ofdiscussion groups on the Internet. Filtering telephone calls on the basis of content is more problematic, as filtering systems cannot recognise spoken words very easily.

Mr Campbell pointed out that the complete lack of democratic oversight on data being intercepted, filtered and stored within Echelon was extremely worrying. Equally worrying was the existence of ILETS (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar), a US- led forum in which officials from EU countries and from the US, Australia and New Zealand meet annually to discuss their requirements for intercepting communications. These meetings, initiated in 1993 by the FBI, are unknown to European parliamentary bodies. They proved the degree to which interception activities are getting out of control, he said.

(To read Duncan Campbell´s 'Special Investigation: ILETS and the ENFOPOL 98 Affair', click here .)

New methods are continually being brought forward, such as installing viruses, stealing information, inserting secret listening facilities into hardware and software before they reach the consumer. The Swedish government found such facilities in its Lotus Notes, while last year an NSA cryptographic key was found in a Windows operating system.

Mr Campbell stressed that the boundaries between legitimate law enforcement interception on the one hand and interception for clandestine intelligence purposes on the other must not be allowed to blur. Moreover, the interception by one EU Member State of communications from other Member States seemed to him to contravene the Convention on Human Rights. To protect itself from interception by external states, Mr Campbell recommended that the EU strengthen its security and cryptography. While this would not stop interception activities, it would certainly discourage and diminish them.

Several MEPs wondered how reliable Mr Campbell's evidence was. Others, however, pointed out that some governments, including that of Belgium, had admitted the existence of Echelon. Belgian MEP Patsy SÖRENSEN (Greens/EFA) called for an inquiry by the European Parliament.

To read Duncan Campbell´s report (PDF-file), go to http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/pop-up.htm .

Choose: 'Vol 2 - Interception Capabilities 2000'

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